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This paper studies the importance of the economic advantages and some distribu-
tional consequences generated by public and subsidized rental housing as well as 
rent control policies in 
Spain. Individual benefits are defined as the difference 
between the rent the protected dwellings would have in the market, minus the rent 
actually paid for them. The market valuation is obtained with an hedonic function 
estimated for the uncontrolled private sector. Data for the Madrid Metropolitan 
Area in 1974 show that for both policies, benefits are of considerable importance, 
while its distribution among beneficiaries is very unsatisfactory according to horizon-
tal and vertical equity criteria. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background information. In Spain, like in other countries, govern-
ment intervention in the housing sector takes many forms. We will con-
centrate only on certain aspects of two specific policies: rent control, and 
what we call public and subsidized housing. 
On the one hand, together with the compulsory renewal clause on all 
leases, which dates from 1920, a 1946 law froze systematically all rentals at 
the level reached at the time of the first contract, following up on transitory 
regulations in the same vein already in effect in previous years. 
A 1955 law made a dramatic policy change, allowing for an almost 
unrestricted bargaining on all contracts made after May 12, 1956. Present 
legislation, enforced since the July 1, 1964, sanctioned and extended that 
policy change. Lease renewals are still compulsory, but rents in new 
contracts are now determined by market forces; owners and renters are also 
allowed to include rent revision clauses subject only to annual ceilings set by 
the government. However, for all housing rented before 1964, the power of 
rent revision remained with the government. Although this power has been 
exercised on several occasions since that date, only moderate increases have 
been permitted. Therefore, we must distinguish between private rental 
housing occupied before or after the crucial date of 1964, which we will call, 
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respectively, pre-64 or controlled housing, and post-64 or liberalized hous-
ing. 
On the other hand, the public sector promotes housing construction, 
either directly (public housing) or, more often, through moderate subsidies 
and/or substantial financial and tax incentives to the private sector (sub-
sidized housing). In both cases, the State retains the power of fixing rents 
and sale prices below market levels for most housing types, according to 
complex procedures in whose detail we need not enter here. Finally, when 
public or subsidized housing is sold rather than rented, the buyer receives 
considerable tax benefits and has access to more favorable financial condi-
tions than if he had acquired his home in the unsubsidized private sector. 
Therefore, as a result of government intervention, we must distinguish, 
within the owner-occupied sector, between public, subsidized, and private 
housing; and within the rental sector, betwee~ public and subsidized 
housing on the one hand, and pre-64 and post-64 private housing on the 
other hand. Unfortunately, official statistics seldom classify available infor-
mation according to this breakdown. Nevertheless, the following data 
should suffice to put into perspective the policies just summarized. 
1. The growth of the Spanish housing sector during the last 30 years has 
been impressive, particularly from the early 1960s until 1974 when the 
recession hit Spain. According to census information, the housing stock 
grew from 6.370 million units in 1950 to an estimated 12.850 million in 
1980. In 1975, 43% of the dwellings had been built after 1960. 
2. The contribution of public policy to this process has been important, 
especially since the end of the 1950s. In 1980, the construction of more than 
four million units (or about 30% of the total) had been either subsidized or 
directly taken up by the public sector. Numerous and complex legislative 
changes, plus the intricacies of the practice, have lead to a situation in which 
the available statistics fail to distinguish between these two types of protec-
tion. Nevertheless, reliable estimates indicate that only 10 or 15% of the 
above figure can be considered public housing, while the remainder has been 
built by the private sector with subsidies, financial and, above all, tax 
incentives. 
3. In recent decades we have witnessed a revolution in tenure modes. 
According to census data, the share of rental housing has declined from 52% 
in 1950 to 30% in 1970. A recent national survey indicates that this 
percentage has gone down to 25% in 1980. The decline has been also in 
absolute numbers: from 3.265 million in 1950 to 2.629 in 1970. 
The strict rent control up to 1964, the impediments still remaining after 
the liberalization in that date (compulsory renewal clause and government 
limits to annual rent increases), and the uncertainties created by the 
possibility of further legislative change, have turned the construction in-
dustry toward the owner-occupied sector. On the other hand, a public policy 
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TABLE A 
Percentage Distribution by Tenure and Legal Type 
Other 
Public and Private Public and Private forms of 
Owner occupied Rental 
subsidized sector subsidized sector tenure Total 
All of Spainb 
Urban areasD. b 
Madrid metropolitan 
area" 
15.8 
23.9 
20.5 
44.4 
26.1 
37.7 
8.9 
15.7 
8.0 
21.9 
27.5 
23.5 
9.0 
6.8 
10.3 
100 
100 
100 
DProvincial capitals and municipalities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, whose 
stock represents 45.4% of the total. 
bFrom a 1973-1974 Family Expenditure Survey. 
"1974 data used in this article. 
which concentrated on granting tax benefits to private suppliers has not 
worked deliberately in the direction of redressing the balance in favor of 
rental housing. Preferences of Spaniards for owning their home rather than 
renting it may have also played a role in this process. 
4. It should be noted that the importance of both rental housing and the 
sum of subsidized and public housing has been greater in the more urbanized 
areas of the country, as the following data (Table A) indicate. 
Unfortunately for the nonsubsidized rental sector the Family Expenditure 
Survey did not provide the breakdown into pre-64 (or controlled) and 
post-64 (or liberalized) housing. Our data for the rental sector of the Madrid 
Metropolitan Area (MMA hereafter) show the following percentage distri-
bution: pre-64, 37.3%; post-64, 37.1%; and public and subsidized (PS 
housing hereafter 2 ) 25.6%. 
2. The purpose of this paper. An assesment of these policies must begin 
by verifying whether they attain the central aim of providing housing at 
rents and prices below market levels. There is little doubt that rent controls 
have been effective and that public housing should be less expensive, but 
whether this is the case for subsidized housing is still an open question in 
Spain. 
Assuming that the policies work-and leaving aside efficiency considera-
tions-we are interested in the evaluation of its distributional consequences. 
It is almost otiose to remind ourselves of the skepticism that has always 
surrounded rent control as a redistributive measure among economists of 
different persuasions. In the Spanish case, this a priori skepticism must be 
extended to our second policy, because until recently the only access 
2Doubts about the reliability of the breakdown of PS housing into its two components lead 
us to carry out most of the analysis in terms of the aggregate of public and subsidized housing. 
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requirement to most PS housing has been the ability to pay the correspond-
ing rent or sale price. 
On the basis of a housing survey conducted in 1974 for the MMA, a 
previous article by one of the authors [6] explored two issues: the extent of 
the economic advantages generated by both policies, and some distribu-
tional problems. 
As a first approximation, economic advantages for rental housing were 
assessed in terms of average rents and the ratio rent/family income which is 
a measure of the effort that households devote to the satisfaction of their 
housing needs. For owner-occupied housing, average prices per square 
meter were compared for the period 1960-1974. The basic information for 
the rental sector, which is the subject of the present paper, is reproduced 
here as an Appendix and can be summarized as follows. 
Our data on average and median rent show that rents have been frozen 
over time when this was the policy aim, while the impact of the legislative 
change started in 1956 is felt only from 1960-1964 onwards. Moreover, 75% 
of pre-64 households, but only 17.6% of post-64 households, devoted to rent 
payments less than 10% of their income. 
For PS housing as a whole, average rent payments and the ratio 
rent/family income were also lower than in the market sector, although the 
differences were not as large as in the previous case. However, these 
averages hide strong discrepancies when one stratifies the sample by 0c-
cupancy periods or type of builder: rents for PS housing occupied during 
the 1964-1974 period, are on average similar to those for post-64 private 
housing; while public housing is considerably cheaper than the different 
types of subsidized housing. 
The second part of that paper addresses itself to the evaluation of the 
population breakdown into beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries generated by 
those policies. For that purpose, occupants of rent-controlled housing, and 
renters and owners of PS housing-on the one hand-and renters and 
owners of uncontrolled housing-on the other hand-were classified in 
terms of a number of personal characteristics. For each characteristic, the 
comparison of the percentage distributions of those five groups and the 
population as a whole, lead to the following conclusions. 
From the point of view of vertical equity, rent control legislation is clearly 
progressive: households of smaller income or family size, or whose head is a 
female, or an aged person, or a member of the nonworking population, or 
has a low educational level, are more than proportionally represented in the 
pre-64 housing sector. The opposite is the case for the occupants of PS 
housing in all tenure modes. The net effect of both policies taken together is 
neutral or slightly progressive. 
From the point of view of horizontal equity, government intervention in 
the housing sector is unsatisfactory: important proportions of deserving 
4
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social groups do not benefit from these policies. In turn, a good part of the 
groups which do not need special help are among the beneficiaries. In this 
respect, PS housing policy does considerably worse than rent control 
legislation. 
Two objections can be raised against the descriptive work just sum-
marized. 
(1) As far as the way of measuring the economic advantages provided by 
these policies, the aggregate nature of data on average rents or the propor-
tion of income devoted to rent payments in each sector may hide relevant 
differences at the housing unit level.3 For a more definite analysis, it is 
necessary to go to the microeconomic leveL and treat housing services as a 
heterogeneous and multidimensional commodity. 
(2) This distributional study does not exhaust the evaluation of public 
policy from the equity point of view. One would like also to apply the 
vertical and horizontal equity criteria to each group of beneficiaries taken 
on its own. Thus, for instance, one thing is to assert that the greater the 
proportion of poor families within a certain group of beneficiaries with 
respect to the population as a whole, the greater is the vertical equity of that 
policy. It is quite a different thing to assert that this criterion is better 
satisfied the greater the inverse association between the amount of individ-
ual benefits and the income level of the beneficiaries. Clearly, the same 
policy can be satisfactory in one case and unsatisfactory in the other. 
Following Lowry et al. [3] in their study of rent control in New York 
City, the aim of this paper is to meet these two objections in the Spanish 
case. This means that we have to estimate the economic advantages of every 
one of the housing units under the two public programs. Lowry et al. [3] 
defined the benefit of a rent controlled apartment as the difference between 
the rent that it would achieve in the free market and the amount paid for it. 
In one of the first applications of the hedonic approach in urban economics, 
these authors predicted market rents for controlled apartments with the help 
of an estimated equation explaining rents for uncontrolled apartments in 
terms of a vector of its characteristics. Once we have a list of individual 
benefits, we can study (a) up to what point differences in benefits are 
explained by a vector of recipients' personal characteristics, and (b) the sign 
and degree of association between benefits and each of those personal 
characteristics. 
The paper is organized in five sections. In Section I we justify the 
definition of benefit we use, and establish its relationship with other welfare 
measures in the context of Rosen's [5] model of demand for an indivisible 
and differentiated commodity. In Section 11 we describe the data, and 
3 On the other hand, differences in the proportion of income devoted to rent payments should 
be interpreted with caution. They surely reflect differences in the relative price of housing 
services. But they might also reflect systematic differences in preferences for housing services 
versus other goods within each of the several groups. 
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confront a statistical problem which must be solved before applying our 
methodology in the rent control sector. Section III presents the distribution 
of benefits. Section IV contains the regression results of benefits on personal 
characteristics. The paper closes with some concluding comments on the 
equity question. 
I. THE BENEFIT CONCEPT 
In a rental housing market, transactions are purchases (or sales) of a 
bunch of characteristics, attributes, or traits which are acquired (or sup-
plied) as a joint product. Under an urban economics interpretation, the key 
to the Rosen [5] model lies in the formulation of each agent's decision 
problem in characteristics space, rather than in the space of the multitude of 
possible varieties of that differentiated commodity we call housing services. 
(As a matter of fact, in order to use calculus, Rosen assumes that housing 
services are subject to continuous differentiation.) 
If we treat housing as an indivisible commodity, each consumer maxi-
mizes his utility by choosing a quantity x of an homogeneous good, which 
represents consumption of all other commodities, and a single dwelling unit, 
represented by a vector z = (zl,'" ,zm) whose components are the quanti-
ties of the m housing attributes. 
Now let us place ourselves in 1974, the year in which our data were 
collected. Make the consumption price equal to one, and denote by F( z) the 
market valuation function which gives 1974 rents as a function of housing 
attributes. Next, consider a consumer who in 1950 rented an apartment of 
characteristics ZC = (zf, ... ,z:;,) under any of the two public programs we 
are studying. Denote by RC the monthly rent paid for this apartment in 
1974. His utility level will be U C = U(XC, ZC), where XC = Y - RC and Y is 
his monthly income in that year. 
Finally, assume that this consumer is forced to rent a dwelling unit at 
market prices; that is, he is forced to solve the problem 
Max U(x, z) {x,z} s.t. x + F(z) = Y. 
Denote the solution to that problem by (x*, z*). His new utility level 
u* = U(x*, z*) will be smaller than uc. Consequently, it seems acceptable 
to identify his welfare loss-or what is the same, the benefit he enjoys under 
the public program-with the difference uC - u*. We need a money mea-
sure of this welfare difference. 
We start with two concepts of money benefits. The first is simply Hicks' 
compensating variation in this context. 
DEFINITION 1. Let (x', z') be the solution to the problem 
Min x + F(z) {x,z} s.t. U(x, z) = u
C 
6
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and let Y' = x' + F(x'). The public program benefit to this consumer is 
R' = Y' - Y = (F(z') - RC) +(x' - xc). 
Alternatively, one can give a second definition which incorporates the 
restriction that consumption of x remains constant. 
DEFINITION 2. Let z" be the solution to the problem 
Minx C + F(z) 
{z} 
and let Y" = XC + F(z"). Then the constrained compensating variation is 
R" = Y" - Y = F(z") - RC. 
Unfortunately, the possibility of estimating the benefit notions just dis-
cussed runs against the following difficulty: without knowledge of the 
consumer's demand functions, x', z', or z" are not observable. Consequently 
one is bound to accept the simplifying assumption that if the consumer is 
forced to go to the market, he will continue occupying a dwelling unit of 
characteristics zC. In this case, the only value of x which permits him to 
reach the utility level uC is xc. Therefore, the natural extension of the 
previous notions becomes the definition given by Lowry et al. [3]. 
DEFINITION 3. Let Y = XC + F(zC). Then R = Y - Y = F(zC) - RC. 
It is important to establish the relationships among these definitions. 
Remark. Since u* < uC, and each successive definition incorporates an 
additional constraint to the previous one, we have 
Y < Y' ~ Y" ~ Y. 
Wherefrom, one obtains 
0< R' ~ R" ~ R 
with 
R' < R" if z' =1= Z" 
and 
R" < R 
Thus, our operational measure of the economic advantages provided by 
either of the public programs constitutes an upper bound for the con-
strained and unconstrained Hicksian compensating variations defined for 
our problem. 
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This benefit measure is intuitively reasonable. Think for instance, of the 
possibility of asking the owner of an apartment rented in 1950, to make an 
estimate of the damage he suffers because the 1964 Spanish legislation 
liberalized rents only for new contracts. A plausible answer would be 
the difference between the rent he could obtain in today's market minus the 
amount he gets. The benefit we assign to that apartment is simply the 
counterpart of the owner's loss. 
The main objection to the measurement procedure we have described is 
the following. In the context of Rosen's model, the estimated equation 
R = F( z) reflects the equilibrium of supply and demand for each housing 
variety. So far, we have only considered using this relationship to find a 
1974 market valuation for a single dwelling under the protection of any of 
the two public programs. But if we want to estimate, for example, the 
market rent of all pre-64 housing as if, in 1974, rent controls were retroac-
tively abolished, it is to be expected that the function F( .), and hence the 
implicit prices for characteristics, would change drastically. However, 
without an econometric model of the housing market (which should proba-
bly include the owner-occupied sector) to predict the new rent function after 
the increase in supply, we are forced to value all dwellings under rent 
control, using only that sample information about post-64 housing which 
reflects the 1974 actual market equilibrium. 
11. THE DATA 
The data come from a 1974 housing survey of 4067 housing units in the 
MMA (or 0.4% of the total number for that area). There were 1240 
observations for rental housing with information on all physical traits. 
These were broken down into 317 PS housing units, 463 pre-64 observa-
tions, and 460 post-64 data. As explained in another paper by the authors 
[4], 17 of the 460 post-64 data were rejected as outliers. Columns 1 to 3 in 
Table 1 contain a description of housing traits for these three groups. 
Before going further, we had to pay attention to a methodological 
problem affecting rent control housing. Suppose we accept the use of F( . ) to 
estimate 1974 market rents of controlled pre-64 housing. Is it legitimate 
from a statistical point of view to take those regression coefficients to 
predict rents of controlled dwelling units, whose traits are presumably 
different from those of post-64 market housing? The main difficulty is the 
following: while housing occupied between 1965 and 1974 can be divided 
into "old" or "modem" (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 1) according to 
whether they were built before or after 1964, all of pre-64 housing can only 
have been built before that date. 
Clearly, the question is not whether pre-64 and post-64 dwelling units are 
similar, since they are not as can be seen comparing columns 2 and 3 in 
8
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TABLE 1 
Mean values (and standard deviations) of the continuous traits 
Post-64 housing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Name of Pre-64 
variable PS housing housing Total Old Modem 
RENT 3033 1069(1,945) 4585(4,335) 3649(3,445) 5348(4,812) 
AGE 16.9 47.1(23.4) 21.6(23.1) 39.8(23.1) 6.8(2.3) 
OCUP 9.6 27.7(12.9) 3.5(2.2) 4.0(2.5) 3.2(1.9) 
M2 70.6 65.0(42.6) 68.2(42.7) 62.5(48.5) 72.9(36.7) 
NFL 6.4 4.2(2.1) 5.1(2.8) 4.0(2.5) 6.1(2.8) 
DET 1.3 1.3(54.7) 4.5(17.2) 9.7(24.6) 0.19(1.12) 
ACC 36.3 29.8(12.4) 41.4(17.6) 37.1(19.2) 44.9(15.3) 
HIGH 0.33 0.32(0.81) 0.06(0.88) 0.26(0.93) -0.10(0.79) 
OLD 0.11 1.04(1.43) 0.11(1.33) 0.68(1.37) - 3.4(0.57) 
Percentage of dummy variables 
AXIX 18.6 6.7 15.1 
CHTW 5.7 6.0 4.1 5.5 2.9 
LESS 1.3 38.7 18.5 40.2 0.8 
TWOM 16.7 9.5 10.6 11.6 9.8 
TELPH 58.7 61.2 35.4 37.7 33.6 
CHEAT 25.2 8.0 20.5 10.5 28.7 
GAR 2.5 0.6 7.2 5.0 9.0 
FURN 12.3 0.6 15.3 13.6 16.8 
BEXP 30.6 19.4 18.0 12.6 22.5 
Number of 317 463 443 199 244 
observations 
Note. RENT = monthly rent in pesetas; AGE = age of building; OCUP = years of occupancy 
from 1974; M2 = square meters; NFL = number of floors; DET = deterioration state. The 
next three variables refer to the neighborhood to which housing units belong: ACC = 
accessibility index in minutes of transportation time to the CBD; HIGH = socioeconomic 
index; OLD = index of buildings age. AXIX = built during the 19th century; CHTW = chalet 
or townhouse; LESS = less than one full bathroom; TWOM = two or more bathrooms; 
TELPH = telephone; CHEAT = central heating; GAR = garage; FURN = furnished; BEXP 
= building expenditures included in another concept (not necessarily the rent bill). 
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Table 1. The problem is whether the influence of different traits on market 
rents is independent of the age of the building. 
To decide this question we performed a covariance analysis. The first 
conclusion was that the results were sensitive to the way the variable AGE 
was included in the model. As we saw in Pefia and Ruiz-Castillo [4], its 
effect was nonlinear. Therefore, the stratification of the post-64 data into old 
and modern sub samples affected the best specification. After some pre-
liminary trials, we decided to represent the effect of the building age by a 
second-order polynomial. The resulting covariance analysis leads to the 
acceptance of the homogeneity hypothesis. That is to say, the effect of the 
different traits on market rents can be considered independent of building 
age. 
Consequently, we felt entitled to use the best estimated model for post-64 
housing to predict market rents for both pre-64 and PS housing samples. 
For later reference, Table 2 summarizes the regression results of such a 
model estimated in Pefia and Ruiz-Castillo [4]. 
TABLE 2 
Determinants of Market Rents: Regressions Results 
for Post-64 Housing 
Variable Coefficient t Values 
CONSTANT 8.13 24.4 
AGEa -0.09 -3.0 
AXIX 0.12 1.5 
OCUP -0.08 -10.3 
M2 a 0.39 8.4 
NFLa 0.19 5.1 
DETa -0.08 -4.1 
CHTW 0.49 4.9 
LESS -0.25 -4.3 
TWOM 0.19 2.8 
TELPH 0.15 3.6 
CHEAT 0.13 2.7 
GAR 0.25 3.5 
FURN 0.25 5.4 
BEXP 0.12 2.8 
ACCa -0.41 -5.8 
HIGH 0.08 2.9 
OLD -0.07 -3.2 
Note. Dependent variable: logarithm of monthly 
rent. R2: 0.82; u: 0.32. Number of observations: 443. 
aIn logarithms. 
10
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Ill. COMPUTATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
BENEFIT VARIABLE 
The final model for the determinants of market rent can be written 
17 
In Ri = Po + L AZjl' 
j-1 
i = 1, ... ,443, 
where Zi = (zw .. . , z17i) is the vector of significant traits of the ith dwelling, 
measured in the previously indicated metric. 
Since the dependent variable has been logarithmically transformed, the 
expression 100 . Pj is an estimate of the percentage increase in rents due to a 
marginal increase in Zj. Thus, for the years of occupancy variable (OCUP), 
100 . 0.08 = 8% is interpreted as the annual rate of rent inflation during the 
1965-1974 period. 
The possibility of avoiding the rent inflation experienced in the market 
sector over that period is an advantage generated by the public programs 
under study. Consequently, in computing the benefit perceived we are 
interested in valuing all protected housing units as if they had been rented 
precisely in 1974; that is, making OCUP = O. We order the 17 explanatory 
variables so as to leave the OCUP variable in first place. Then, the benefit of 
occupying a pre-64 or a PS housing unit of characteristics (z2i' ... ,z{7i) and 
a controlled rent RC is computed as follows: 
Before building an explanatory model of a statistical variable, it is 
convenient to study its distribution to identify errors in the data, and to 
check, in a first approximation, if the data can be treated as homogeneous. 
In our case, benefits depend on housing traits by construction. Therefore, 
plots of benefits against the variables which have intervened in its computa-
tion also illustrate whether there are uniform variation patterns, and may 
serve to detect atypical values. 
Four of the 463 pre-64 sample points lacked information on occupants' 
personal characteristics. The listing of benefits for the remaining 459 data 
revealed the existence of four negative values. In absolute value, two had 
benefits twice as large as mean benefits for the whole sample, while the other 
two were very small. A careful examination of the four observations lead to 
the conclusion that the two extreme values correspond to attractive dwell-
ings whose rent was most likely freely bargained for under the modification 
of rent control legislation introduced in 1956. Since plots of benefits against 
11
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housing traits confirmed the atypical nature of both extreme observations, 
we eliminated them provisionally. 
In the PS housing case, 16 of the 317 data (about 5%) yielded negative 
benefits, indicating that the rent regulation mechanisms may have been 
inefficient. On average, these 16 dwellings were of a somewhat better quality 
than the rest, and they certainly paid a 1974 rent (7762 pesetas) well above 
the public housing mean (3033 pesetas). The mean rent for the five dwellings 
with the greater negative benefits was 11,800 pesetas, while plots of benefits 
against housing traits showed that they were outside the pattern followed by 
the rest. However, preliminary tests indicated that the regression of benefits 
on personal characteristics did not improve when the five extreme data were 
eliminated. We decided to maintain provisionally all 317 data until more 
rigorous tests were performed. In any case, we deleted also six positive 
values-suspiciously high. 
A previous work by one of the authors [6] indicated that the personal 
characteristics of pre-64 households varied noticeably according to the 
TABLE 3 
Some Characteristics of the Benefit Distribution 
(1) (2) Benefits = (1)-(2) 
Mean Mean 
predicted actual Standard Number of 
rent rent Mean deviation Median Asymmetry Kurtosis observations 
PRE-64 HOUSING 
All data 4694 945 3749 2187 3194 1.60 3.84 457 
Occupation period 
Up to 1940 4688 782 3906 2411 3206 1.53 2.51 158 
1941-1956 4687 733 3954 2206 3349 1.80 5.55 148 
1957-1964 4706 1322 3384 1865 3186 1.12 1.63 151 
PS HOUSING 
All data 6553 3033 3520 2586 3198 0.40 0.39 317 
Occupation period 
Up to 1954 7019 912 6107 33 
1955-1%8 6153 1758 4395 134 
1969-1974 6806 4638 2168 150 
Type of constructor 
Public sector 6237 1540 4697 2329 4839 -0.17 2.37 73 
Private firms 6383 3390 2993 2447 2285 1.06 1.50 111 
Other private 
insti tu tions 6522 2719 3834 2787 3929 -0.02 -0.44 68 
Unknown 71% 4428 2768 2397 2424 0.63 0.82 65 
12
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occupancy period. Also, the mean rent of PS housing units was very 
different when one stratified the sample by occupancy periods or type of 
builder. Accordingly, Table 3 shows some characteristics of the distribution 
of benefits for all these housing groups. 
Table 3 suggests the following comments: 
(1) The mean monthly benefit enjoyed by rent control housing is four 
times greater than its average rent payments, or 16.3% of the average 
monthly income for the MMA as a whole. For PS housing, the mean 
monthly benefit is of a comparable order of magnitude (15.3% of the 
average monthly income for the MMA). A comparison of columns 1 and 3 
of Table 1 shows that, on average, PS housing appears to be of superior 
quality to market housing along many dimensions. Consequently, our model 
predicts a 1974 mean market rent for PS housing (6553 pesetas) well above 
both mean rent actually paid (3033 pesetas), and mean rent for post-64 
housing (4585 pesetas). 
(2) When we stratified the rent control sample by occupancy periods, the 
improvement in some dimensions (age, size, deterioration state, hygienic 
services, and central heating) as the year of occupancy approaches 1964, 
appears to be offset by the worsening in some others (neighborhoods' 
accesibility and socioeconomic indexes). Accordingly, our model predicts 
about the same market rents for the three periods considered. Differences in 
mean benefits, which are not statistically significant, are due to differences 
in actual rents. For PS housing, the further away the year of occupancy, the 
greater the mean benefits. Moreover, units built by the public sector receive 
mean benefits significantly larger. 
At any rate, in the subsequent regression analysis of benefits on personal 
characteristics, we will study the need to stratify both pre-64 and PS 
housing samples according to occupancy dates, as well as sign of benefits 
and types of constructor in the latter case. 
IV. THE REGRESSION OF BENEFITS ON PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Once benefits have been computed and their distribution examined, we go 
on to study households' characteristics on which we have information. We 
have 3 continuous variables and 7 dummy variables. Table 4 gives some 
characteristics of the distribution of households classified by the type of 
housing they occupy and 10 demographic and socioeconomic variables we 
will be using. 
It can be observed that for households in rent controlled dwellings, family 
income is smaller, while there is a greater incidence of families with one or 
more secondary nucleus, or headed by retired people, a female, a person of 
greater age, or of a lower educational level. On the contrary, households in 
PS rental housing have characteristics similar to the population as a whole. 
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TABLE 4 
Personal Characteristics of Households in the MMA, Oassified by the Type 
of Housing They Occupy 
Rental housing 
Pre-64 PS housing Post-64 Rental & owner-occupied 
housing in the MMA 
Continuous variables 
INC 18,283 23,303 24,318 23,013 
Mean 15,675 15,469 20,330 17,861 
Standard deviation 15,000 18,000 18,000 18,000 
Median 
PAGE 
Mean 57.3 44.4 39.0 46.7 
Standard deviation 13.4 14.6 13.2 14.3 
Median 57.0 42.0 36.0 45.0 
SIZE 
Mean 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.7 
Standard deviation 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.7 
Median 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Dummy variables (percentages) 
Socioeconomic status 
of household head 24.8 8.8 7.4 12.4 
RETI 31.1 36.3 41.9 41.3 
LOW 8.1 20.5 24.8 18.1 
ALTA 36.0 34.1 25.9 28.2 
Remaining households 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Educational level 
of household head 
ILPR 42.9 24.2 28.8 30.6 
ASUP 3.9 6.6 5.9 5.9 
Remaining households 53.2 71.0 66.1 63.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
FSEX 24.4 12.9 10.6 11.7 
NUCS 8.9 7.6 3.0 5.3 
Number of observations 459 317 460 3.636 
Note. INC = family income in pesetas per month; PAGE = age of household head; SIZE = family 
size; RETI = retired; LOW = low socioeconomic status; AL TA = high socioeconomic status; ILPR = 
illiterate or unfinished primary school; ASUP = university or professional degree; FSEX = female 
household head; NUCS = family with one or more secondary nucleus. 
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Interesting as this information is, it is relevant to complete it by an 
evaluation of the horizontal and vertical equity with which benefits gener-
ated by the two public programs are distributed among the corresponding 
groups of beneficiaries. For that purpose, benefits in each sector are 
regressed on the 10 personal traits we have mentioned. 
From the statistical point of view, we applied the methodology discussed 
in detail in Peila and Ruiz-Castillo [4]; (1) estimation of the Box-Cox 
transformation parameter X of the dependent variable; (2) study of the 
possibility of different sample stratification schemes; (3) careful analysis of 
the regression robustness in the presence of outliers; and (4) final selection 
of explanatory variables using the Cp Mallows statistic. 
(1) The maximum likelihood estimation of the Box-Cox parameter with 
457 data was X = 0.4 for the pre-64 sample. To simplify matters we took 
X = 0.5, which implies taking the square root of benefits as the best 
transformation of the dependent variable. 
The existence of large negative benefits in the PS housing sample meant 
that we had to add up to this variable 3761 pesetas to make all values 
strictly positive as required by the Box-Cox procedure. Therefore, we 
reduced the relative variability, pushing the estimation of the Box-Cox 
parameter toward one. The actual estimate was X = 0.8, well above the 
pre-64 figure. 
(2) To decide on the need for stratification of both samples along the 
dimensions mentioned at the end of the previous section, we performed a 
covariance analysis. The results were the following. (a) The homogeneity 
hypothesis for the coefficients of the 10 personal variables was acceptable at 
the 99% confidence level when we stratified the PS housing sample accord-
ing to the benefit sign and the occupancy periods, and at the 95% level in 
the statification of PS housing by type of builder, and of pre-64 housing by 
occupancy periods. (b) The hypothesis that the occupancy period or the 
type of builder did not cause significant vertical displacements of the 
regression equations was rejected in all cases at the 99% confidence level. 
Therefore, in what follows, we include the following additional explanatory 
variables. For rent-controlled dwellings: 
04156 = 1, 
05764 = 1, 
For PS housing units: 
05568 = 1, 
06974 = 1, 
PP = 1, 
if it was occupied in the 1941-1956 period; 
if it was occupied in the 1957-1964 period. 
if it was occupied in the 1955-196,8 period; 
if it was occupied in the 1969-1974 period; 
if it was built by the public sector; 
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PF = 1, 
PUNK = 1, 
if it was built by a private firm; 
if the nature of the constructor was unknown. 
(3) As far as the study of anomalous data, we began by investigating the 
effect of eliminating from the pre-64 sample the two extreme observations 
with negative benefits which we referred to in Section H. With 459 data, 
only 4 of the 10 personal characteristics were significant, while the coeffi-
cient of determination was 0.12. With 457 data, the number of significant 
variables and the coefficient of determination raised, respectively, to 6 and 
0.31. Therefore, as previously anticipated, we felt justified in rejecting the 
two observations in question. 
As we explained in [4], with the internal analysis of robustness of the 
data, we are interested in verifying: first, whether each observation is an 
outlier; and second, whether its influence on the estimated parameters is 
large or small. The first fact is judged by a t statistic [1]; and the second, by 
the Cook D statistic [2]. 
In the rent control sample, we isolated 14 presumably atypical observa-
tions according to t values, which ranged from 4.1 to 7.7. Out of these 14 
data, at least 3 have a certain influence on the estimated coefficients, judging 
by its D values. But two of those have residuals of the opposite sign and 
similar t values, so that it is possible that its combined effect is not large. 
Each of the 11 remaining observations appear to have a small influence on 
the estimation. The succesive elimination of 3, 5, and 14 suspicious observa-
tions, grouped according to the size of their t values, did not lead to a more 
convincing estimation of the regression coefficients. Moreover, the estima-
tion of the Box-Cox parameter without the 14 atypical data leads to 
A = 0.5, close to the value A = 0.4 with the full sample. In conclusion, we 
decided to reject none of the 457 observations. 
Within the PS housing sample, we detected 8 data with high t values and 
hence presumably atypical. Two of them had also a high D value and a 
considerable influence on the estimated coefficients. After careful study of 
the effect of eliminating each of the 6 remaining outliers, we decided to 
reject a total of 4 of the 8 observations on the following grounds: with 313 
data, 4 new variables become significant; the significance of 2 other vari-
ables improves; and 4 additional variables which were also significant with 
317 data remain equally so. 
(4) To the list of variables already mentioned, we added up the following 
three interaction terms with the purpose of measuring possible nonlinear 
effects among some personal characteristics: 
CAPI = INC / SIZE 
SEXA = FSEX - PAGE 
POLD = PAGE / INC. 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Results 
Pre-64 housing PS housing 
Variable Coefficient t value Coefficient t value 
INC 0.00037 6.7 
CAPI 0.002 1.8 
SIZE -0.83 -1.7 
POLD -222.6 -2.1 
FSEX -16.5 1.9 
SEXA 0.25 1.9 0.7 2.5 
RETI -6.0 -3.0 
LOW -11.4 -6.3 
ALTA -5.2 -1.8 48.5 3.2 
ILPR -4.5 -3.0 -55.5 -4.1 
04156 2.2 1.9 
05764 -2.7 -1.5 
05568 -77.6 -4.3 
06974 -174.4 -9.5 
pp 23.1 1.4 
PF -29.0 -2.0 
PUNK -56.4 -3.5 
Dependent variable (Benefits)o.5 (Benefits)o.7 
R2 0.315 0.388 
ij 14.11 282.6 
Number of 
observations 457 313 
The final selection of relevant variables was made according to the 
Mallows Cp statistic, which estimates the mean quadratic prediction error of 
the regression. The results are summarized in Table 5. 
V. CONCLUSIONS ON THE EQUITY QUESTION 
The final model indicates that, from the equity point of view, the impact 
of both policies among the beneficiaries is unsatisfactory. 
(1) For rent control housing, personal characteristics explain only 30% of 
the difference in benefits. For PS housing, this proportion is 11% (the 
remaining 34% is explained by the period of occupancy and the type of 
builder). The large proportion of unexplained benefits means that the 
horizontal equity principle is badly fulfilled: two families of identical 
characteristics can receive very different benefits. 
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TABLE 6 
Regression Results, Including Housing Traits 
Pre-64 housing PS housing 
Variable Coefficient t Value Coefficient t Value 
INC O. ()()()()()()9 -0.03 
CAPI -0.02 -2.7 
SIZE 0.3 1.1 
POL 36.9 (0.7) 
FSEX -6.7 ( -1.6) 
SEXA 0.09 1.4 0.2 0.9 
RETI -0.06 -0.6 24.5 1.7 
LOW -0.5 -0.5 
ALTA -1.4 1.0 6.1 0.5 
ILPR 0.7 0.9 -19.2 -1.8 
04156 -1.4 -1.5 
05764 -6.2 5.9 
05568 -46.9 -3.1 
06974 -119.4 -7.2 
PP 17.4 1.4 
PF -26.5 -2.4 
PUNK -65.5 -5.4 
AGEQ -2.1 -2.1 3.7 0.3 
AXIX 4.2 3.6 
M2Q 10.0 11.4 106.9 6.3 
NFLQ 0.8 0.9 1.8 0.2 
DETQ 
-2.9 -11.5 -32.7 -5.4 
CHTW 13.0 8.8 64.6 2.5 
LESS -~O -9.5 -7.1 -0.2 
TOWM 8.1 6.0 56.3 4.1 
TELPH 4.2 5.2 4.0 0.4 
CHEAT 2.1 1.4 0.6 0.05 
GAR 20.6 5.0 29.5 0.9 
FURN 16.4 4.0 26.1 1.9 
BEXP 5.6 6.4 40.6 4.6 
ACCQ -13.1 -6.8 -164.8 -7.8 
HIGH 1.4 2.0 7.0 -0.9 
OLD -2.2 -5.7 -22.0 -3.9 
Dependent variable (Benefi ts) 0.5 (Benefits)0.7 
R2 0.85 0.73 
IT 6.78 65.35 
Number of 
observations 457 313 
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(2) As for vertical equity, the results are not very encouraging either. In 
the rent control case, except for the case of the SEXA variable, the signs of 
all other variables are opposite of what would be desired: that the house-
hold head has a low socioeconomic or educational status, or belongs to the 
female sex, or the nonworking population, is associated with lower benefits. 
However, the greater the family income, the larger the benefits perceived. 
Finally, while female household heads of greater age receive greater benefits, 
the opposite is the case for households heads which are simultaneously old 
and low income recipients. In the PS housing case, the results are slightly 
more mixed: retired people and households headed by an older female 
received 'greater benefits. But to belong to the higher socieconomic status, or 
to receive a larger income per capita has also a positive premium, while 
belonging to the lower educational level is associated with lower benefits. 
The bad distributional consequences of rent controls should not surprise 
us when it is understood that this legislation assigns benefits to housing 
units without inquiring into occupants' demographic or socioeconomic 
characteristics. It would only be by chance that a policy measure which in 
1964 left without liberalization the controlled rents of all dwellings occupied 
before that date would favor, on the one hand, the most deserving groups in 
the population and, on the other hand, would generate benefits ten years 
later as a function of the characteristics of its fortunate occupants. The 
results are even less surprising in the case of PS housing, when one recalls 
that, unti11976, the economic advantages of this policy in Spain were given 
indiscriminantly to those willing and able to pay the rents fixed by govern-
ment regulations. 
As a final exercise, we estimated a model explaining benefits in terms of 
personal characteristics and housing traits.4 The results for both samples are 
summarized in Table 6. Naturally, the goodness of fit is considerably 
improved. In the case of pre-64 housing, the influence of all personal 
characteristics on benefits becomes negligible. For PS housing, three of 
those variables (RETI, ILPR, and CAPI) remain significant; in regard to the 
vertical equity principle, the novelty is that now the greater the income per 
capita, the smaller are the benefits, as would be desirable. The sign and 
magnitude of the significant variables allow us to conclude that the size of 
the benefits generated by both public programs are associated to those 
dwellings of a better quality. 
4Since benefits are in turn dependent on physical characteristics, the estimated relationship 
can be written as a highly nonlinear equation explaining actual rent payments as a function of 
housing traits and personal characteristics. We have not worked out this relationship because it 
is of marginal interest to the equity problem we are interested in. 
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APPENDIX 
1974 Mean Rents in the MMA (in pesetas per month) 
Mean monthly Standard Number of 
rent deviation Median observations 
Private housing 
by occupancy year 
up to 1940 788 803 600 160 
1941-1956 735 829 500 149 
1957-1%0 854 828 520 58 
1%1-1%4 2180 1939 900 96 
1%5-1970 3254 1447 2500 140 
1971-1972 4150 2621 3400 137 
1973-1974 5563 2229 4000 183 
PS housing 
by occupancy year 
up to 1954 912 751 600 33 
1955-1968 1786 1961 1000 136 
1969-1974 4673 2130 3500 151 
PS housing 
by type of constructor 
Public sector 1540 2921 600 74 
Private firms 3390 2468 3000 112 
Other private 
institutions 2718 3022 1900 69 
Unknown 4428 3373 3500' 65 
Pre-64 housing 1068 1275 500 463 
PS housing 3078 1756 2600 320 
Post-64 housing 4439 1114 3500 460 
Percentage Distribution of the Quotient Housing Rent/Family Income 
Less than 0.35 or 
0.10 0.10-0.14 0.15-0.19 0.20-0.24 0.25-0.29 0.30-0.34 more Total 
Pre-64 74.9 8.9 7.5 2.8 2.4 1.5 2.0 100.0 
PS housing 43.5 13.9 16.7 10.1 7.3 3.5 5.0 100.0 
Post-64 17.6 22.2 18.3 13.7 8.7 5.2 14.3 100.0 
20
370 PENA AND RUIZ-CASTILLO 
REFERENCES 
1. V. Barnett and T. Lewis, "Outliers in Statistical Data," Wiley, New York (1978). 
2. R. D. Cook, Detection of Inftuential Observations in Linear-Regression, Technometrics, 19, 
15-18 (1977). 
3. I. S. Lowry, 1. de Salvo, and B. M Woodfill, "Rental Housing in New York City 11: The 
Demand for Shelter," The New York City Rand Institute, New York (1971). 
4. D. Peila and 1. Ruiz-Castillo, Robust Methods of Building Linear Regression Models. An 
Application to the Housing Sector, 1. of Business and Economic Statistics, 2, 10-20 
(1984). 
5. S. Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competi-
tion,l. Pol. Econ., 82, 34-55 (1974). 
6. J. Ruiz-Castillo, La intervencion del Estado en el Area Metropolitana de Madrid: Una 
primera aproximacibn, ICE, 58S (1982). 
21
